B. Scotus’ own Opinion

31. I concede the conclusion of the above reasons [nn.16-24], that this nature, from the fact it does not exist only in the intellect nor in its cause but outside its cause, necessarily has its own actual existence just as it has its own quidditative being; but it does not have its own being of subsistence, because subsistence states - over and above existence - nothing other than negation of double dependence, as was said about personhood in d.1 nn.44-47 supra. Now this existence [sc. subsistence] is not dependent, just as neither is the nature it belongs to, but such existence is that of the Word; so there is here only one subsistence.

32. The reply is made [Aquinas] that a prior can be separated from a posterior without contradiction; existing is prior and absolute.

33. On the contrary: the question is not about a new miracle other than the assumption, but if the nature is not deficient, it does not lack its own existing; proof has been given that it does not lack it [n.31].

34. And proof is given in another way, that then depending would be repugnant to the act of the creature; for nothing depends save according to its existing.

35. Likewise, our nature would be formally less perfect in Christ than in Peter, because existing is posited as the ultimate perfection.

36. I say further too that there is an existence, different from uncreated existence, that is the existence properly and simply of this supposit [sc. the supposit has two existences even though it has one subsistence, n.31].

The first point [sc. ‘properly’] I make clear through the opposite: for the existence of my foot is not the existence of me, although it is in me, for the reason that I am not my foot, nor subsistent with respect to my foot the way my supposit is with respect to my nature; but the existence, contrariwise, of my foot is not different from the existence by which I exist, but is only some partial existence in the existence by which I exist. But the opposite is the case here: for the Word subsists in human nature as a supposit in that nature; and, because of this, the Word is properly called ‘man’, and so he is existent with the existence of that nature.

37. Second [sc. about ‘simply’] I also say that he exists simply with that existence; for although Socrates formally exist with the existence of white, because he is formally white, yet he only exists with that existence in a certain respect, because that existence is existence in a certain respect, and especially in regard to the existence of Socrates which in itself is existence simply. But in the issue at hand the existence of the human nature is in itself existence simply, insofar as being is divided into ‘simply’ and ‘in a certain respect’; and ‘being simply’ is substance, while ‘being in a certain respect’ is accident, according to the Commentator [Averroes] Physics 1 com.62 [cf. Aristotle Physics 1.7.190a32-33, Scotus Ord. 4 d.1 q.3 n.45].Text cancelled by Scotus, “now the existence of human nature is the existence of substance; therefore, since the divine Word is a man simply by that existence, he exists simply by that existence.” ⁵³

38. And if you say [Godfrey of Fontaines] that it is true that the nature’s existence in itself is existence simply but not so in the Word - on the contrary: the sort that the existence is in itself is the sort that it gives to whatever exists through that existence; the Word exists with that existence, namely through human nature.

39. And this last point [n.38] was perhaps the motivating reason for others about this opinion [n.15], that this existence of the human nature was not the first existence of this supposit but comes to it when it already has perfect existing; therefore it seemed to be an existence of the supposit in a certain respect, so that, although one should concede that there are several existences in Christ, yet one should not concede that there are several existences of Christ, because only one of them, as being the first, would belong to him simply and the others would belong to him in a certain respect.

40. But this is not conclusive, because not every non-first existence of something belongs to it in a certain respect - but the existence that is of the sort that every substantial nature is, is not of a nature to give existence in a certain respect, however it be disposed to what it gives existence to.

41. But if dispute is made regardless that the ‘existing not first’ of a supposit and the ‘not existing simply’ of a supposit mean the same, then the contention is only in words, and the opinions, which seem to be opposed, are not in contradiction save verbally.Vatican editors: because everyone concedes that the first existing of Christ is the existing of the Word (Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines). ⁵⁴ But “when the thing is agreed, one should use no force about the word,” Augustine Rectrations 1 [rather Against Cresconius 2.2 n.3, “The discipline of disputation teaches.. .that when there is agreement about the thing, one should not labor over the word”].

42. This second opinion [sc. Scotus’ own], as to what it maintains about double actual existence, is confirmed by Damascene ch.58, where he holds that in Christ there are two wills as well as two willings; but existing is more immediately related to essence than willing is to will; so there is a greater necessity for existing to be multiplied in accord with the plurality of natures.